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No. 6219-

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JosEPH F. :MERRILL,
Plari·ntiff' and Respondent,

vs.
BAILEY & SoNs CoMPANY, a corporation; SEYMOUR N. BAILEY,
and EMl\IA Z. BAILEY, his -vvife;
J. vV. SuMMERHAYS & SoNs CoMPANY, a eorporation; CoLORADo
ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS rCOMPANY,
a corporation ; LEoN A B. W HLTEHILL, adn1inistratrix of the
Estate of Bert N. Bailey, Deceased; HOBERT BAILEY vV RITEHILL; C. E. SuMMERHAYS and
J. J. SuMMERHAYS,
Defendants and Appellants,
JoHN ScowcROFT & SoNs CoMPANY, a corporation,
Defenda.nt not appealimg.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL D]jSTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CouNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, HoN. P. C. EvANs, JuDGE.
HuRD & HuRD,
1\foYLE, HrcHARDs & McKAY,
JUDD, HAY, QuiNNEY & NEBEKER,

ttpeysE~ts.

FIL

J. D. SKEEN and
E ..J. SKEEN,
..fl.
.
.
Attorneys for RespblJibJt.· ·,

, L~J

'
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•
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOSEPH F. :MERRILL,

Plaintiff and

Responden~t,

vs.
BAILEY & SoNs CoMPANY, a corporation; SEYMOUR N. BAILEY,
and EMMA Z. BAILEY, his wife;
J. W. SuMMERHAYS & SoNs CoMPANY, a corporation; CoLORADO
ANIMAL BY-PRoDUCTS 'CoMPANY,
a corporatio!n; LEONA B. WHITEHILL, administratrix of the
Estate of Bert N. Bailey, Deceased; RoBERT BAILEY WRITEHILL; .C. E. 8uMMERHAYs and
J. J. 8UMMERHAYS,

No. 6219

Defernda.nts GJnd Appellants,
JoHN ScowcRoFT & SoNs CoMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant not appealing.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
With leave of court we submit briefly appellants'
re.p1y to certain contentions made by respondent in his
brief and upon the oral argument.
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At the risk of some repetition \Ve believe it will ibe
helpful to reset some of the historical background
against Wlhich the problem must be viewed. It will be
remembered that respondent's property rights in the
s·outh half of Lot 3 are immedirutely north of appellants'
property, which is in Lot 2. Titles of respondent and
appellants all ·came from a -common grantor. When
title to the south half of Lot 3 and Lot 2 was in the same
owner substantial improvements were made· upom Lot
2. Such improvements came to the north line of Lot 2
so that the full enjoyment of the same ·could be had only
by using a portion of the ·s-outh half of Lot 3 for purposes of ingress and egres·s. A spur track was necessary
to give re~al value :to the buildings on Lot 2. Such a track
necessarily had to o'Ccupy a portion of the s-outh half of
Lot 3. Such a spur wa!S ~built and of course it approached
the buildings to be served upon a cure.

In order to

make the the curved track serve the buildings in the
manner in WJhich it must have been untended, it was necessary tu build a -curved platform to make contact between railroad

~cars

and the buildings.

Having spent the money to improve Lot 2 and having
provided the means of access to such improvements over
Lot 3 it is certainly most unlikely that the common owner
would sell the south half of Lot 3 upon such terms as to
impair the easements which had been established and
reserved and thereby seriously depreciate the value of
the improvements upon Lot 2.
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Con~istent

"·ith wha1t one might reasonably expect,
such use was made ·of the south haH of Lot 3 as to give
a maximum value to Lot 2. Accordingly, when Seymour
Bailey deeded his one-half interest in the south half of
Lot 3 to his brother, Bert, lhe quite naturally inserted
in the deed the follow1n:g reservation:
"Reserving, however, to the grantors the perpetual right to the maintenance and use of the
plartJorm now lo~ated on the Southern portion
of said premises about 10 feet wide including
the over-lapping roof for said platform i~n
cluding also the curve thereof along the railway spur as at present -constructed, with full
right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the
same within its present location.
''Also reserving the perpetual R.ight to the use
of the trackage over :and .along the South line
of said premises (·and to the premises) a,nd of
the team, truck -or auto drive along the said
tra'Ck, all Ito be used in eonneetion and for the
convenience of Lot 2, of ·said Block for the
loading and unloading of mercha,ndise.
"It is als-o ;hereby agreed that without the consent of Grantor, Seymour N. Bailey, or his
assigns, that no right shall be granted for the
use of said railway spur beyond the East end
of said Lot 3. ''
The language in rl:he reservatinn second above quoted
appears in the abstract of title CE·x. X)_ at page 23 exactly .as set out above, but a check of the record in the County Recorder's office of Sallt ·Lake County revea.l·s that the
words ''and to the premises'' in brackets above are not
in the reservations as recorded, and it is, therefore, apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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parent that the· abstracter i'n eopying the record from
the Recorder's office must have made a typographical
error and inserlted the words ''and to the premises'' by
mistake, but the fact still remains that plaintiff in his
reply admitted defendants' allegation of the reservation
in this language, and EJGhibit X is the only abstract which
was received in evidence. The record from the County
Recorder's ·office was not offered in evidence, and so far
as concerns the record in the trial court and before this
Court, the words '' a1nd to the premises" are in the rese-rvations, and the findings of the trial -court are in fa:ct
''false to' the record'' as made on (the trial of this action
because the onJy evidence before the Court as to the exact language of the reservation was the a:bstract of the
rights of way, Exhibit X.
But regardless of whether the words ''and Ito the
premises'' are in the re'Servation or mot, it should be noted
that it is re.cited that the rig,hts of way and other easements and righits reserved were ·''all to be used in connection and for the convenience of Lot 2'', which clearly
shows that the intent .and purpose was to reserve the
same rights and uses theretofore exercised lin order to
preserve and maintain the value of Lot 2. The south!
half of Lot 3 had heen impressed with uses for the benefit of Lot 2 and the broad easement ''for the convenience
of Lot ·2" was for the purpose ·Of continuing that use.
Similarly, when Seymour and Bert Bailey conveyed
to Bailey & Sons Company lthey were jealous of the
rights of Lot 3, whjeh were neces'Sary to maintain the
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value of Lot 2. By that instrument .o.f conveyance there
was granted an easement as follows:
''together with the ttracka.ge privilege now in use
at the North end of said property. ·* * *

"*

* * Also a perpetual Right to the use of
the railroad spur together with the team,
truck and auto drive along the North line
thereof and the platfomn for loading and unloading from vehicles and .cars, through and
over a part of the South lf2 of ·Lot 3, of said
Block and Plat as at present constituted, with
a Right to repair, reconstruCJt or rebui1d the
same as shall from time to time become necessary within its present location.''

Respondent would restrict the easements reserved
and granfed in two particulars to which we desire to
there addres·s ourselves. First, it is contended that no
easement exists which g[ves a·ppellants any rights north
of the spur track and that if any :such right exiSJts it is
for the exclusive benefit of one parcel of land in Lot 2.
Counsel for respondent would have you believe that the
team track or truck drive north of the spur wa·s employed
and used only for approach to an .ancient hay barn in
Lot 3 (see appellants' brief, page 13). Such contention
is i)n ·Confli.ct with the dear and uncontradi·cted evidence
and with the definite and unamlbiguous language of the
deeds referred to. It ·was testified by the witness Ryser
that he had been secretary of Bailey & 8ons Company
continuously from 1the year 1914 to and including the
trial, a. matter of more tham. twenty years; that he had
seen the premises involved in this suit throughout that
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long pe~iod and was entirely familiar with the his~ory
thereof and the uses made ·Of the property. Speaking
of the team or truck track referred to in the easement
Ryser stated that througholl!t the years it was the uniform habit of teamsters and truck drivers to drive in
the south baH of Lot 3 on the truck track referred to a~1d
from that poii1Jt to back across the spur track to the
north to and against the platform for loading and unloading of n1erchandise to and from the buildings in Lot
2 (Ab. 94, 9r5, 99).
To the same effect .is the testimony of vVilliam I.
Richards, who has been in the employ of Bailey & Sons
~continuously from the year 1910 until 1the time of the
trial. During that time he was for fifteen years warehouse foreman; he had the closest acquaintance and
familiarity with the property involved and throughout
the years had ~seen and observed the use made of the
south half of Lot 3 in relation to Lot 2 and the buildings
located thereon. Speaking of the use of the concrete
team track, :Mr. Richards made the following statement
which stands in the record unc.ontradicted:
''We used the team track in driving teams and
later trucks into the front of the Globe Mills
~building .and out again. The use of the area
marked on Exhibit '7', 'concrete team track',
has continued from 1910 right up to the present time. It is still used to drive trucks in
there to turn around and to load and unload
from the box cars.
''We used practically all of the South half of Lot
3 in pulling ·Our teams in, backing up to the
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platforms, and in our other operations. The
major portion of the area to' the north of the
railroad spur track has been used for turmli:ng the teams and truoks around and backing
them into the platform and ~cars. We used
all of the area west of the old original wood
platform in backing the teams .and trucks up
to the platform. We would put in two wagons
from the ·west, ome from the north in the
jog and we could spot more wagons along the
track to the north. The area to the west
and north of the 10 foot jog was all used in
pulling the trucks and wagons in. T,ha t area
is being used today iby wagons or trucks driving across it and has been so used all the time
since 1910. '' (Ab. 109-110)
1

The testimony of the witnesses Ryser and Richards
is not only not disputed in the record but is .corroborated
by the testimony of respondent '·s witnes·ses. That the
concrete driveway referred to is morth of the- spur track
and that it was used throughout all the years from 1910
until the t}me of the trial for convenience in backing
teams and trucks against the platform for loading and
unloading is without dispute.
The easememt above referred to des~cribes the right
of way as a "perpetual right to the use of the railroad
spur together with the team, truck and auto drive along
the north line thereof.'' Counsel would have us helieve
that the parties intended to use the word "south" rather
than the word ·''north'' in the above description. They
say that the roadway referred to is south of the tra0ks
but it would take more than a distortion of the language
above quoted to indicate anything other than an intenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion to describe a spur track and a driveway north of
suc.h spur track.
Furthermore, there never was and is no room for a
driveway south of the spur track. It is undisputed that
the common grantors of the parties prior to 1'914, pavea
with concrete a driveway about 10 to 12 feet wide along
the north line or side of the spur track and following the
curve thereof from the place where the spur now crosses
the 'City ·sidewalk pr.aduca.lly the full length of the spur,
and with a paved turn-around in front .of the Globe
Mills building, and which .paved driveway and turnaroUJnd still exists and is still in use upon the ground
today just as it has been for more than thirty years.
After having constructed and paved a driveway along
the north line of the spur for the express purp.ose of enaibling trucks and vehicles to conveniently load and unload to and from the platforms adjoining their warehouses on Lot 2, as well as to and from box cars on the
spur, it is preposterous to .claim, as counsel now attempts
to, that the common gra1ntor.s of the parties did not refer
to this paved driveway when they reserved and granted,
for the benerfit of their warehouse property in Lot 2,
a ''perpetual flight to the use of the railroad spur, together with the team, truck and auto drive along the

north line thereof, etc.'', but instead referred to the area
south of the spur where there never was and is no room
for a drive·way either along the line of the spur or elsewhere on that side of the spur.
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But counsel says eYen if appellants are ·correct in
respect to the truck or auto drive north of the spur track,
still such easement is not for the benefit of all of Lot 2,
but only for a s1nall parcel thereof standing presently in
the name of Sun1merhays. Even if this -contention of
respondent were correct, the judgment of the trial court
would have to fall because the trial ·Court has deprived
all appellants of any rights whatsoever north of the spur
track. It is perfectly plain that error has been committed in this particular. But it is by no means admitted
that the auto drive north of the spur track constitutes
an easement only for the benefit of one parcel in Lot 2.
The original easement described the reservation as for
the convenience of Lot 2. The use made of the track or
driveway has always been for the use of Lot 2 and the
whole thereof and a restriction of that benefit to a single
parcel in Lot 2 would be a derogation of the language
of the reservation and grants themselves and the uninterrupted interpretation of those grants as evidenced by
the use made of the driveway throughout all the years
since 1910.
Counsel stoutly asserts that by the easement contained in the deed from Seymour N. Bailey to Bert N.
Bailey the platform involved in this case was limited
to a width of ten feet. Such a conclusion is not supported either by the language of the easement or by the
other evidence in the record. It is true that the platform
is referred to in the deed as being about ten feet wide
but one must read further to learn the true nature of the
platform. Witness the language: "reserving, however,
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to the grantors the perpetual right to the maintenance
and use of the platform now located ~on the southern
portion of said premises about ten feet wide including
the over-lapping roof for said platform including also
the cu,rve thereof along the spur as at present constructed." It will be noted that the platform was described as ten feet wide but there was also reserved the
curve thereof. What was plainly intended was to describe
a ·curved platform which would be ten feet wide if the
curve were eliminated. The spur tra-ck would have been
useless to the property which it was intended to serve
unless contact were made between the spur and the buildings. In order to bring the railroad and the buildings
into contact it was apparently necessary to build a platform which was ten feet wide on the tangent and which
curved with the curve of the spur track, becoming wider
constantly as the spur track curved to the north. That
the parties never intended to reserve an easement for
a platform in the form of a parallelogram 10 x 75 feet
is not only made perfectly clear by the reservation itself
but by all of the witnesses who testified. So clearly has
this been made, in fact, that even respondent has attached to his brief for illustrative purposes a map which
shows that the platform must have been wider than ten
feet from its western extremity eastward, at least until
the point 'vas reached where the curve of the spur track
straightened into a tangent.
According to respondent's own witnesses,

~now

and Evans, the platform was at least thirty feet wide
opposite the west door of the Northwestern Hide ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pany building when l(elly-SpringTI.eld Tire Co. built a
ramp at right ang·les to this building and over the platform, so as to roll tires into trucks and box cars on
the spur (~-\b. 130-135 ), so it is idle to contend that
there e\·er was a platform only 10 x 15 feet between
the spur and the warehouse buildings. As pointed out
in our original brief, the language in the reservation,
"about 10 feet wide", obviously refers to the approximate width of the platform near its easterly portion
and at the east end of the curve of the spur. This is
borne out by the sequence of the language of the reservation itself in relation to the actual conditions on the
ground. Thus, the reservation, after referring to the
platform as "about 10 feet wide", goes on "including
the overlapping roof * * *, including also the curve
thereof along the railway spur etc.'' In following this
description upon the ground, if one started out at the
easterly end of the platform and proceeded westerly,
he would find a platform now approximately seven feet
wide at its easterly end and in front of the old Scowcroft building, and then pr.oeeeding westerly, he would
come to the "overlapping roof," which the Court will
observe from the pictures in evidence is at the easterly
end of the Northwestern Hide Company building, and
just west of the old Scowcroft building, and then proceeding west the curve of the spur is encountered, just
in the order recited in the reservation.

On the other

hand, if, the words ''about 10 feet wide'' in the reservation are attempted to be applied to the westerly end
of the platform ·or its width at such end they neither
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coincide with the other language of the reservation, with
the conditions as they existed on the ground, or with the
testimony of any of the witnesses. As the Court will
observe fro·m the diagram in respondent's brief, the
darkly shaded area represents the platform which counsel claim is described in and authorized by the reservation in the deed. If you attempt to follow upon the
ground the language of the reservation connnencing
at the westerly end of the claimed platform, you cannot
do so because the platform at this point is twenty feet or
n1ore away from the spur track, and it is, therefore, impossible to include or follow the spur by proceeding
to the east, and it is likewise impossible to include the
overlapping roof which is some distance to the east and
its westerly edge is a considerable distance from the
spur. On the other hand, as above pointed out, if you
follow the language of the reservation ,on the ground
commencing at or near the easterly end of the platform,
the roof and the curve of the spur all coincide on the
ground exactly with the language of the reservation,
aud in the ,order or sequence there specified.
Counsel says that if the old platform had been
''about 10 feet wide'' at its easterly end, it would have
extended out into the spur. This is obviously not true.
Upon the diagram in his brief, counsel shows the platform in front of the Sco·wcroft building to be between
six and seven feet in width. This is a new platform
whieh replaced an old platform which had originally
been some two feet wider-such two feet having been
cut off on the spur side to allow better clearance as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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te:stified by the witnesses, and hence it appears that
the old platform at its easterly edge and in front of the
old Scowcroft building was s01ne nine feet or thereabouts in width, which certainly qualifies as being'' about
10 feet wide.'' \Yhen this portion of the ~old original
platform was in existence, there was no roof over the
same, and the roof referred to in the reservation is that
attached to the X orthwestern Hide Company building,
which, as previously noted, coincides exactly with the
language of the reservation.
As the Court will observe from a careful reading of
the evidence, there were originally and at the time the
deeds in question were made, two platforms, one on top
of the other along the north wall of the Hide Company
building. The lower or so~called basic platform followed
along the line of the spur as it curved to the north,
while the other or upper platform, which was built on
top thereof was straight and extended only in front
of the two doors of the I-Iide Company building, and
had a ramp at each end thereof so that the doors of the
building could be reached with hand trucks from the
lower or basic platform, which was some two or three
feet below the level of the doors to the building. To
the north of the upper platform and ·set in the lower
platform in front of the west door to the building and
alongside of the spur were a set of scales upon which
meat and other products were weighed when unl~oaded
from cars on the track and transported into the warehouse building. According to the undisputed evidence,
these meat trucks, after being weighed on the scales were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pushed or pulled along the basic platform to a point
in front of the rainp, and then pushed or pulled to the
east up the ramp on to the upper platform and from
there into the warehouse ( Ah. 120). The location of
these platforms may he observed in the pictures in
evidence, which disclose lines or marks plainly evident
on the Hide Company building showing the exact location of these platforms and ramps.
To have accommodated the upper platform, ramps
and scales, and to have been used as it admittedly was
used, the basic platform must have been more than ten
feet wide and must have come to within a few feet of
the spur track. The ramp to the upper platform admittedly extended to the west of the west door of the Hide
Company building. Evidence of its location may be seen
today on the building, and is shown in the pictures received in evidence (Ex. 1, 3, 6; Ah. 92-3). In order to
have reached this ramp with meat trucks from the scales
in front or north of the upper platform, the basic platform must have filled in the area between the building
and the spur track not only to the west door of the
building, but at least as far west as the westerly end
of the ramp and some distance beyond in order that
the meat trucks could be turned around preparatory to
pushing or pulling them up the ramp. A platform
only ten feet in width would not have permitted this
use, .and as there is no dispute in the evidence concerning this use of the platform, it is evident that the same
must have been of substantially the width claimed by
appellants and their witnesses.

The physical facts and
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admitted use of the platform bear thi::; out, and the men
who worked over the platfonn £or more than twenty-five
year::; testified that it \Yas thirty-two feet wide at its
westerly end, and the man who tore down the platfonn
when it was replaced by the concrete testified that it was
thirty-two feet wide, that he took out and measured
the stringers which supported the platfonn, and that
there were two stringers butted end to end, one measuring eighteen feet and the other fourteen feet in length
(Ab. 103).
~\s pointed out in our original brief, however, the
size of the old platform is not of controlling importance.
Appellants admittedly have the right to maintain a platfonn of some dimensions along the south line of plaintiff's property and following the curve of the spur. Admittedly appellants have and are entitled to easements
over all of the property south of the spur. This being
the case, appellants admittedly have not encroached
upon any of plaintiff's ground over which they did not
have rights and easements, in the construction of the
concrete rarnp and paving of which plaintiff complains,
and the question therefore, is as to whether appellants
are making any use of this property not within the terms
of the rights and easements, and which increases the
burden upon respondent's property and deprives respondent of some use he is entitled to make of this portion of his property. Admittedly the only use appellants
are making of this property is for the maintenance ,of
a loading platforrn and to drive over the intervening

ground to such platform, which are the very uses reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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spondent admits appellants are entitled to make of this
property. The point upon which the parties divide concerning the property south of the spur track is not the
use of the property or the quantity of property which
appellants are entitled to use, but the manner in which
it is put to the uses which appellants are admittedly
entitled to make of it-it being respondent's contention
that appellants should be limited in driving over and
traversing the property to driving over level terrain to
a platform_ with a perpendicular edge instead of over a
slight incline to the platform itself, which is the manner
in "-hich the property is used at the present time.
As we pointed out in our original brief, appellants'
easements may not be so restricted in the absence of a
showing that the burden upon respondent's property is
increased by the manner in which the owners of the easements are exercising their rights. Although counsel
assert that the burden is increased by the slight change
in the level of the terrain so as to back up to the platform level rather than to a perpendicular edge of a
platform, they neither point to any evidence in the record
which justifies this assertion, and there is none, nor do
they show or attempt to show wherein the burden is
increased by this manner of use. They assert that the
value of the property has been decreased by this manner
of use, hut again we observe there is no evidence of any
decrease in the value of the land. and likewise there is
no evidence whatsoever that the plaintiff cannot make
every use of this portion of his property which he could
make before the ramp was constructed, or if the terrain
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now covered by the ramp was entirely flat terminating
at loading platforms of the character that respondent
claims were there present before the ramp was constructed. This being the case, the decree appealed from,
we submit, is erroneous in requiring removal of the
ramp, as well as in excluding appellants from the use
of the team, truck and auto drive north of the spur, and
for those reasons, as well as for the other reasons discussed in our original brief, should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HuRD

&

HuRD,

:MoYLE, 'RICHARDs &

McKAY,

JuDD, RAY, QurNNEY

& NEBEKER,

Attorneys for Appella;n.ts.
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